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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the conditions under which minority pro-
posal rights emerge from majority voting in a legislature. I
develop a legislative bargaining model in which rules persist,
i.e., remain in effect until a majority agrees to change them.
In each session, legislators first determine whether a minority
leader can offer amendments, and subsequently they deter-
mine policy using these procedures and majority rule. The
main result demonstrates that legislative majorities grant
minority rights today in order to moderate policy tomor-
row when they may become the minority. This mechanism
operates without punishment strategies and private infor-
mation and in the presence of polarized and unified parties;
however, persistent rules are necessary for the right to sub-
stantively influence policies. Comparative statics indicate
that weak parties, super-majority rule, patient legislators,
and extreme proposers encourage the adoption of minority
rights. More broadly, these results demonstrate the im-
portance of persistent rules for the endurance of inclusive
institutions and political compromises, and they suggest one
reason for procedural differences between the House and
Senate.
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Although legislative agenda-setting powers entail substantial policy influ-
ence (Kalandrakis, 2006; McKelvey, 1976; Romer and Rosenthal, 1978;
Shepsle and Weingast, 1987), majority coalitions often reserve some
proposal rights for their minority counterparts. Legislatures frequently
employ more open rules such as amendment agendas (Rasch, 1995)
and allow members of the opposition to amend bills just prior to final
passage (Krehbiel and Meirowitz, 2002; Mattson, 1995). Furthermore,
the removal of these rights commonly requires a majority vote, so the
rights must meet the tacit approval of either the legislative leadership
or a legislative majority. Despite the prevalence and importance of
minority proposal rights, political scientists lack a theoretical account
of why majorities relinquish their agenda-setting monopoly under the
most competitive conditions, including polarized voting coalitions and
the absence of retaliation from future majorities or the electorate.
In this paper, I address this gap in the literature and advance a
new theory of minority rights in legislatures where rules and policies
persist, that is, continue from one legislative session to the next until
a majority agrees to change them. Persistence does not mean rules
and policies cannot change; indeed, legislators have the opportunity
to alter them in every session. Rather it encourages legislators to
consider the long-term consequences of their actions because those
who prefer the current rules or policies receive a potential advantage
tomorrow. For example, persistent rules reflect the interpretation
of the U.S. Senate as a “continuing body” and hinder amending the
cloture requirement even under a potential majority vote (Binder and
Smith, 1997). Likewise, many western-democratic parliaments organize
themselves using standing orders, a collection of rules which continue
from session to session.1
To consider the effects procedural persistence, I construct a legisla-
tive bargaining model in which two parties, or coalitions of legislators,
rotate between serving in the majority and minority. Each party has a
at MPSA and SPSA, and two anonymous referees for feedback and comments. In
particular, thanks to Tasos Kalandrakis for invaluable discussions and encouragement.
All errors are, naturally, my own.
1For example, Huber (1996) discusses how standing orders include important
rules such as a vote of no confidence. In fact, the requirement that U.S. House of
Representatives reaffirm its rules in every session before passing legislation is more
of an exception than a norm.
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leader who makes proposals on behalf of her copartisans. The legislative
session begins with a procedural stage in which the majority leader
may propose to change the rule determining whether the minority can
offer an amendment, and any rule change is subjected to a majority
vote. I call the minority’s ability to offer an amendment the minority
right. Subsequent normal business of the legislature operates under a
majority-rule amendment agenda in which the majority leader makes
a policy proposal, and the minority leader offers an amendment only
if the current rule allows for the possibility. This process repeats, and
elections exogenously change the majority party and the placement of
the legislative median over time.
In this framework, I uncover two results that link procedural per-
sistence to the creation and endurance of minority rights. The main
result is that when rules persist and the majority fears becoming the
minority, legislators adopt and subsequently maintain the minority right
to moderate future policy outcomes. This occurs even with ideologically
polarized parties, some sessions that have unified majorities, and policy-
motivated legislators who do not use punishment strategies. The second
result demonstrates that persistent rules are necessary for the right to
emerge and substantively influence policy in this bargaining setting.
More specifically, when the minority right is adopted in an equilibrium
and procedures do not persist, another equilibrium exists with identical
policy outcomes in which the right is never adopted. Likewise, persistent
rules still encourage the legislature to adopt minority rights even in a
more complicated environment with persistent policies.
These results emerge from the interaction between persistent rules
and uncertainty over the future partisan composition of the legislature.
When the partisan composition of the legislature potentially changes
overtime, legislators in the majority fear becoming the minority in future
sessions because they lose their agenda-setting power and the policy
influence it entails. To preserve some of this influence, they institute
the minority right, which allows them to subsequently moderate policy
in future sessions where they become the minority. These rights survive
over time because moderate, decisive legislators prevent leaders from
removing rules that moderate policy. The possibility that the legislative
median may be more moderate than the majority leader poses a strategic
trade-off. On the one hand, the likelihood of joining the minority
incentivizes majority leaders to introduce the right. On the other hand,
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the likelihood of remaining in the majority, but with a more moderate
legislative median, encourages majority leaders to dissolve right because
it dilutes her future agenda-setting powers. When the former likelihood
is relatively large compared to the latter, the legislature adopts and
subsequentlys maintain the minority right.
This mechanism connects several empirical regularities and accounts
in the legislative organization literature. In the model, the minority
right moves policy outcomes away from extreme leaders, and moderate
legislators therefore defend the right, a trend found in the congressional
politics literature (Schickler, 2000). Likewise, it is necessary for rules
to persist for the minority right to emerge and actually moderate
policy. When the majority must actively implement the right in every
session, the minority does not substantively influence the equilibrium
policy outcome even if the right is present, and a procedural advantage
becomes a policy advantage as in cartel models of legislatures (Cox and
McCubbins, 1993, 2005). Finally, the model highlights persistent rules
as an important determinant of the variation in majority party agenda-
setting powers across legislative bodies, for example, why the Senate
employs more inclusive policy-making rules than the House (Binder,
1997; Fenno, 1973; Smith, 2007).2 This analysis suggests that persistent
rules encourage Senate majorities to preserve more open legislative
institutions to moderate future policy outcomes, and these incentives
are absent in the House, which is not a “continuing body.”
The idea that the majority benefits from minority rights is common
in the legislative institutions literature (e.g., Binder, 1996, 1997; Dion,
1997; Dixit et al., 2000; Koger, 2010; Wawro and Schickler, 2006).
However, the current theory differs considerably from previous ones on
two accounts. First, the majority party values the minority right to the
extent that it potentially moderates future policies when it becomes the
minority party. In my framework, legislators are policy motivated and
do not gain informational benefits (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987; Suk-
Young Chwe, 1999; Wawro and Schickler, 2006), fear retaliation (Dixit
et al., 2000; Koger, 2010), or value compromise with more moderate
copartisans (Binder, 1997), which are other explanations for minority
2Although the two chambers employ different rules, debate exists over whether
different rules translate into different levels of majority-party control (Campbell
et al., 2002; Gailmard and Jenkins, 2007; Lazarus and Steigerwalt, 2009; Smith et al.,
2013).
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rights. In other words, the theory here demonstrates that minority rights
can still emerge and endure even with relatively sparse assumptions
concerning legislators who, in the model, are policy motivated and do
not possess private information.
Second, the theory does not require retaliation in the form of grim-
trigger or tit-for-tat punishment strategies, and this is important for
several reasons. Punishment strategies may be impractical in legislative
settings (Krehbiel, 1991, p. 60). In addition, previous work has already
demonstrated how history-dependent strategies generate political com-
promises in repeated games in the absence of persistent rules. (Alesina,
1988; Dixit et al., 2000; Fox, 2006). In contrast, for minority rights to
be credible in my framework, there need exist only a possibility that
moderate legislators are decisive in future sessions. This removes the
need for punishment, and the next section illustrates the mechanism in
a simpler finite setting where punishment is impossible. Furthermore,
by restricting attention away from these types of strategies, the theory
emphasizes the importance of rules to policy compromise. When leg-
islators punish their colleagues for past actions, compromise does not
require minority rights or any other legislative rules. Instead, future
policy decisions themselves can be used to enforce cooperation with
repeated interaction between patient parties.3 By focusing attention
away from history-dependent strategies, the theory plausibly connects
battles about minority rights to battles about policy.
Other efforts that endogenize proposal rights in a bargaining frame-
work fix a closed or restrictive rule and allow legislators to allocate
proposal prerogatives under this rule. In Yildirim (2007), legislators
allocate proposal powers using a contest, and in Cotton (2012) a pro-
poser retains her power if the proposal is successful or if she commands
a majority. McKelvey and Riezman (1992) and Eguia and Shepsle
(2013) investigate seniority rules, and Diermeier et al. (2013) examine
conditions under which even moderate legislators restrict their personal
proposal rights to decrease policy uncertainty. Jeon (2015) considers an-
other form of persistence in the divide-the-dollar setting, where today’s
division determines tomorrow’s proposal powers. In contrast to these
previous works, the model below fixes proposal prerogatives within two
3To see this, note that the majority party solely determines policy in every period
in the model from Dixit et al. (2000).
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policy-making procedures, i.e., open and closed agendas, but allows the
legislature to adopt either rule. Most notably, Diermeier and Vlaicu
(2011) also characterize conditions under which legislatures adopt open
rather than closed rules, and they find that the majority grants the
minority amendment rights only when members of the majority are just
as likely to be on the same side of a random policy issue as members
of the minority. In this sense, their result requires that parties have
members with extremely diverse or uncorrelated preferences, which is
not required for the results here.
Two important predecessors to this analysis are Krehbiel and
Meirowitz (2002) and Krehbiel et al. (2015) who also study minor-
ity amendment rights. The former analyzes a two-dimensional policy
space and finds that the power of the minority to affect policy depends
on the location of the status-quo. The latter investigates a vote-buying
framework and describes how the right moderates policy and encourages
the majority leadership to buy votes. Both papers conclude with dis-
cussions about why minority rights emerge, and these echo some of the
insight of the present analysis. Mainly, they conclude that “moderates
(roughly, pivotal voters) tend to prefer the more open to the more
closed procedure” (Krehbiel and Meirowitz, 2002, p. 212), and that “the
majoriy recognizes that it will one day return to the minority” (Krehbiel
et al., 2015, p. 19). Indeed, these incentives are essential to the main
result of this paper but with an important caveat. Because the theory
is explicitly dynamic, I find that minority rights are introduced and
then supported even when the legislature begins with rules that favor
the majority and there is no expectation of future punishment. In this
case, a policy-motivated majority would have little incentive to first
introduce the minority right without persistent rules.
1 Illustration of the Mechanism
To better understand the mechanism, consider a legislature comprising
three actors: a party leader A, a rival leader B, and a median µ, who is
the representative, decisive legislator. Either leader A or B serves as
the majority leader, and her rival serves as the minority leader. These
actors are policy motivated with ideal points xˆA = 0, xˆB = 1 and
xˆµ =
1
2 , respectively, and I assume legislators have negative quadratic
Fair Play in Assemblies 281
utilities.4 Suppose the normal business of the legislature (its policy-
making process) operates using a majority-rule amendment agenda in
which the majority leader proposes first. Subsequently, the minority
leader offers an amendment if and only if the minority right is in place.
When the status-quo policy is sufficiently bad, the adopted policy is the
majority leader’s ideal point without the right and the median’s with
the right. Essentially, with the minority right, two competing proposers
drive policy to the median, and without the right, the majority leader
capitalizes on her agenda-setting power, a standard result in Romer–
Rosenthal bargaining with a bad status-quo. If the legislature lasts for
one session only, neither leader has an incentive to introduce the right
because it only moves policy away from their ideal points.
Now consider a legislature that lasts for two sessions and has per-
sistent rules, that is, the procedure chosen in the first session becomes
the default or status-quo procedure in the second. At the beginning
of each session, legislators first decide whether the minority can offer
amendments, and the rule changes only if both the majority leader and
the median agree. Normal business remains the same, which means the
legislature adopts the median’s ideal point with the right and the ma-
jority leader’s without the right. Even though rules persist, power does
not. The majority leader in the first session retains her majority-status
with probability p and becomes the minority leader with probability
1− p.
In this dynamic setting, the majority leader has an incentive to
introduce the right. To see this, first note that the median always
benefits under the minority right. This means that he not only accepts
the right when it is proposed but also never allows it to be revoked
when the right is currently in place. Thus, today’s majority leader can
tie the hands of tomorrow’s leader by introducing the right. To see
when this occurs, suppose A is the majority leader in the first session
and suppose the default rule precludes minority amendments. Figure 1
illustrates the two sequences of policies that arise from A’s choice of
procedures in the first session. If A introduces the right, µ accepts
and ensures the right is never revoked, leading to policy xˆµ in both
sessions or a overall payoff of −12 . If A does not introduce the right,
4Negative quadratic utilities are important in this finite example, but less so in
the infinitely repeated game. I discuss this in greater detail below.
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Procedure
A witholds
the right
A introduces
the right
xˆA
xˆµ
xˆA
xˆB
xˆµ
Session 2Session 1
p
A lead
s

− p
B leads
Figure 1: Policies in both sessions given rules today.
i.e., she keeps the closed procedure, she passes her ideal policy in the
first session, but now there is uncertainty over future policies. With
probability p, she retains her majority status, and her ideal policy is
implemented. With probability 1−p, she becomes the minority, and B’s
ideal policy is implemented. Thus, the legislative leadership introduces
the right if and essentially only if p < 12 , and minority rights emerge
even in this finite setting where punishment is impossible.
Although this example illustrates the dynamic incentive encouraging
the legislature to adopt minority rights, it also reveals a large discrepancy
between the majority leaders’ strategies in the first and second sessions.
Specifically, when p is small, the majority leader always introduces
the right in first session and never in the second. Furthermore, if
leader A knew that her rival would introduce the right in the second
session, she would never do the same in the first even when p is small.
These discrepancies arise due to the finite nature of the interaction. An
explicitly dynamic model is required to determine when these strategies
emerge in a repeated setting. The model I construct addresses this
issue, incorporates a more diverse institutional setting, and makes
sharp predictions about when the legislature adopts and subsequently
maintains minority rights.
2 Model of Minority Rights
In this section, I model a legislature that must first choose rules and then
policies in each of an infinite number of sessions. As in the illustration
above, the rules chosen in the current session become the default rules
Fair Play in Assemblies 283
in the next session. Furthermore, the majority party does not know
whether it will remain the majority and whether the party will become
more or less moderate. To model this, consider the following dynamic
game. Two political parties, Party A and Party B, each contain two
groups of legislators. A group is modeled as a single actor, an assumption
which is addressed below. Specifically, Legislator 1 is the leader of Party
A, and Legislator 4 is the leader of Party B. Parties A and B also
include two moderate partisan Legislators 2 and 3, respectively. Label
the set of legislators N .
All legislators i have ideal policies xˆi along the real line, which is also
the policy space. The leaders’ ideal policies are relatively more extreme
than their copartisans’.5 To model this, assume that Leaders 1 and 4
have ideal policies of 0 and 1, respectively. The other two legislators’
ideal policies are more moderate than their respective leaders by distance
d ∈ (0, 12 ]. That is, Legislator 2’s ideal policy is d and Legislator 3’s is
1− d. Hence, d is a measure of intra-party or coalition heterogeneity, a
characteristic of the current party system measuring preference diversity
between coalition members. Figure 2 illustrates the four ideal points.
Every legislator i has instantaneous policy preferences represented by
the quadratic utility function, ui(x) = −(x− xˆi)2 for all policies x.
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 1, 2, . . . ,∞. Each period or
session t is initially characterized by two parameters or state variables.
First, each period has a default legislative rule r¯t ∈ {¬R,R}. Here
r¯t = R denotes the minority right under which the minority leader can

xˆ1
d
xˆ2
 − d
xˆ3

xˆ4
Party A Party B
Figure 2: The layout of legislators’ ideal points.
5It is also possible that there exist partisans groups more extreme than the
leadership, but they are of no strategic consequence in this model and are omitted.
In addition, Clausen and Wilcox (1987), Grofman et al. (2002), and King and
Zeckhauser (2002) note that the majority leadership appears to be more extreme
than than their average copartisan in the American context.
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offer an amendment in the proceeding policy stage, and r¯t = ¬R is the
absence of the minority right or majority dominance that precludes
such an action. If the rule remains unchanged, it governs policy making
in the period. Second, the composition of the legislature determines
the median µt, which must be one of the four legislators. Here, the
median is the decisive legislator of the session, and also determines the
majority/minority parties and leaders. Specifically, if the median is
from Party A, Party A is the majority party, B is the minority party,
and 1 and 4 are their respective leaders. The reverse holds when the
median is from Party B. In other words, the partisanship of the median
co-varies with the partisanship of the majority leader. Label the period’s
majority leader Mt and the minority leader mt.
The interaction in period t proceeds in two stages. In the procedural
stage, the majority leaderMt proposes a rule r
p
t ∈ {¬R,R}. The median
legislator µt then chooses between the default rule and the proposed
rule, and the choice becomes the procedural outcome rt, governing the
upcoming policy stage.
In the policy stage, the majority leader Mt proposes a policy x
p
t ∈ R,
and the rule rt determines whether the minority can offer an amendment.
With a minority right (rt = R), the minority leader mt proposes a
competing policy amendment xat ∈ R, and the median µt chooses the
majority’s proposal, xpt , the minority’s proposal, xat , or some status quo
x¯ as the policy outcome.6 Under majority dominance (rt = ¬R), the
median chooses xpt or x¯ as the policy outcome. In the baseline model,
I assume the status-quo is some mutually disliked policy outside the
interval [0, 1] although it is equivalent to assume that x¯ is some different
outcome that arises when no policy is passed.7 For example, if the
policy space [0, 1] represents a division in the budget between guns and
butter, x¯ is the (very) bad outcome that materializes when no budget is
passed. While this assumption is common in the legislative bargaining
literature (e.g., cases when legislation pertains to appropriations with
zero spending as a default), it may seem restrictive, so I later endogenize
the status-quo policy in an extension.
6In this context, a simultaneous choice by the median is equivalent to a sequential
agenda under majority rule with an odd number of voters.
7Formally, I require ui(x) > ui(x¯) for all policies x ∈ [0, 1] and all legislators
i = 1, . . . , 4, which holds when x¯ is some real number outside [0, 1].
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After the end of the policy stage, the legislature transitions to the
next session, and the two state variables governing policy-making change
as well. First, rules persist, so the current rule becomes the default
rule in the next session, that is, r¯t+1 = rt for all periods t. In other
words, today’s rule remains in place until the majority leader and the
median agree to change it. This makes the model consistent with the
interpretation that the legislature is a “continuing body” where rules
carry over from one session to the next as in the Senate.
Second, elections potentially change the composition of the legisla-
ture in the following manner. The majority party in period t+ 1 is the
current majority party with probability p ∈ (0, 1). In words, p represents
the stickiness of power, i.e., the likelihood of the majority party and its
leader retaining their positions between sessions. I hereafter refer to p
as the probability of retaining a majority. Regardless of the realization
of the majority party, the majority leader is the legislative median with
probability q, and say the majority is unified. With probability 1− q,
the majority leader is not the median, and say the majority is divided.
Thus, a unified or divided majority coalition describes the current state
of the legislature, regardless of the level of party heterogeneity d, which
measures preference diversity within parties. Rather, the probability of
a unified party represents a measure of party strength, and I refer to
q as party strength hereafter. For example, if q is large, party leaders
recruit or pressure their members to share their political goals and
ideology, allowing them to maintain their leadership and median status.
Finally, actors’ total payoffs are the discounted sum of their instan-
taneous utilities over policies with a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
That is, for some sequence of policy outcomes {xt}∞t=1, legislator i’s
total payoff is
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ui(xt),
which completes the specification of the game.
Note that I have reduced a potentially very large legislature to one
with four relevant actors. Because (weakly dominant) voting behavior
with quadratic utilities and a common discount factor satisfy a sorting
condition (Banks and Duggan, 2006), there is no strategic consequence
to omitting non-median legislators who cannot propose. While this
modeling decision pushes the leadership’s proposal monopoly to the
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Type 0 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
Party A Party B
(a) Party A is a unified majority, where Mt = 1 and µt = 1.
Type 0 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5
Party A Party B
(b) Party A is a divided majority, where Mt = 1 and µt = 2.
Figure 3: Histograms of legislators’ ideal points in two different states of the legisla-
ture.
extreme, I illustrate how the model changes when it is relaxed below.
Figure 3 shows how the four legislators can represent a larger assembly by
plotting the distribution of the legislative ideal points in two histograms
with six potential types of legislators. In both histograms, Party A is
the majority party and a legislator from the type-1 group (Legislator 1)
is the majority leader. Notice type-1 legislators are relatively more
extreme than the their more moderate, type-2 copartisans but are less
extreme than their type-0 copartisans. (In fact, type 1 is the median
of the majority party in these examples although this need not be the
case.) However, in the first histogram, Figure 3(a), type-1 legislators
are the median of the assembly, but in the second, Figure 3(b), type-2
legislators (legislator 2) are the median of the assembly. Legislators
who have ideal points represented by types 0 and 5 only affect the
decision-making process by determining the majority party and the
legislative median. As such, these types of legislators, and potentially
many others, need not be modeled.
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3 Minority-Rights Equilibria
In this section, I define the strategies, expected utilities, and equilibria.
Throughout, I impose stationary and Markovian restrictions on the
legislators’ strategies in the sense that they can only condition on
the payoff-relevant state variables. This is standard in these dynamics
games and makes the analysis stronger as it does not rely on complicated
punishment strategies to obtain equilibria which perpetuate the right.
Accordingly, I drop references to the period t below.
The previous section specified a game where within each period
actors move sequentially. Let g ∈ G denote each of the possible op-
portunities for actors to move within any period. I refer to g as a
decision node. More specifically, the set of decision nodes within a
period is G = {rp, rc, pp, pa,mc,Mc}, where rp and rc are the proce-
dural proposal and choice nodes, and pp and ap the policy proposal
and amendment nodes, and mc and Mc the policy choices with and
without the minority right. Figure 4 illustrates the interaction within a
single period of the game and includes the labels of the decision nodes
for reference.
At each decision node g, let Sg denote the relevant state space
and let Ag denote the available actions. Throughout, I refer to states
in Srp as initial states as they describe the initial characteristics of
the legislative session. Table 1 describes the relevant state space and
available action space at each decision node. For example, at the rule
choice node (g = rc), the relevant state space is the default rule r¯,
the legislative median µ, and the majority leader’s rule proposal rp.
Here, the legislative median can either accept the proposal (1 ∈ Arp)
or not (0 ∈ Arp). Let σgi denote a function from Sg to Ag, then a pure
strategy for party leaders i = 1, 4 is a three-tuple σi = (σ
rp
i , σ
pp
i , σ
ap
i ).
8
Likewise, a strategy for moderate legislators i = 2, 3 is also a three-tuple
σi = (σ
rc
i , σ
mc
i , σ
Mc
i ). Then, a strategy profile is four-tuple of strategies
σ = (σ1, . . . , σ4), one for each legislator.
For every strategy σ and every initial state srp ∈ Srp a unique policy
and rule are implemented. Furthermore, this is true at every decision
node. Let xg(sg;σ) denote the period’s policy outcome following strategy
8Here, I implicitly assume that the majority leader chooses her policy proposal
when she is the median. In addition, I allow the majority leaders to mix in the
procedural stage in one result, and these strategies are discussed in the Appendix.
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Procedural Stage Begins
Default Rule: r¯ ∈ {¬R,R}
Median: µ ∈ N
Rule Proposal rp
Majority leader proposes rule
rp ∈ {¬R,R}.
Rule Choice rc
Median chooses proposal rp or
default r¯ to be current rule r.
Policy Stage Begins
Current Rule: r ∈ {¬R,R}
Median: µ ∈ N
Policy Proposal pp
Majority leader proposes policy
xp ∈ R.
Policy Choice Mc
Median chooses proposal xp
or default x¯ as the policy out-
come.
Amendment Proposal ap
Minority leader proposes
amendment xa ∈ R.
Policy Choice mc
Median chooses proposal xp,
amendment xa, or default x¯ as
the policy outcome.
r = ¬R
r = R
Figure 4: A diagram of the interaction within a period.
σ from state sg at decision node g. In a similar manner, rg(sg;σ) is the
procedural outcome following strategy σ from state sg. Let pi(µ′ | µ)
denote the probability that legislator µ′ becomes the median in period
t + 1 given that the median is µ in period t.9 This means legislator
9For example, if the current median is from Party A, then with probability pq
Legislator 1 is the median, with probability p(1− q) Legislator 2 is the median, with
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Table 1: Description of state and action space at each decision node.
Arbitrary Available
Decision node g state sg ∈ Sg actions Ag
Rule proposal (rp) (r¯, µ) {¬R,R}
Rule choice (rc) (r¯, µ, rp) {0, 1}
Policy proposal (pp) (r, µ) R
Amendment proposal (ap) (µ, xp) R
Policy choice with right (mc) (µ, xp, xa) {cq, cp, ca}
Policy choice without right (Mc) (µ, xp) {cq, cp}
The relevant state sg is a vector summarizing the variables affecting an actors decision at
node g. In the table, µ is the median legislator, r¯ is a default rule in {R,¬R}, rp is a rule
proposal, and xp and xa are the policy and amendment proposals, which are from the real
line. The right most column denotes the available actions at each decision node. Here, cq
denotes the legislative median choosing the status-quo or default policy, cp the majority’s
proposal, and ca the minority’s amendment.
i’s dynamic expected utility of implementing policy x and rule r with
median µ takes the form:
Ui(x, r, µ;σ) = ui(x) + δ
∑
µ′∈N
pi(µ′ | µ)Ui(xrp(r, µ′;σ), rrp(r, µ′;σ), µ′;σ).
(1)
Using Equation (1) it is straightforward to define a sub-game perfect
equilibrium in stationary Markovian strategies (equilibrium hereafter),
and the definition resides in the Appendix for reference.
I focus the analysis on equilibria that perpetuate minority rights,
specifically those in which from any initial state and with probability
one, the minority right is adopted and never removed. To define this,
say S ⊆ Srp is an absorbing set with respect to profile σ if for all
s = (r¯, µ) ∈ S and all s′ = (r¯′, µ′) ∈ Srp, rrp(s;σ) = r¯′ implies s′ ∈ S.
In other words, an absorbing set is a collection of initial states such
that, for every state in the absorbing set, the procedural outcomes
associated with the state transition to another state in the absorbing
set. Because every legislator has a positive probability of becoming the
next median regardless of the state, these transitions must include all
probability (1− p)(1− q) Legislator 3 is the median, and with probability (1− p)q
Legislator 4 is the median.
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four medians. Say S is an irreducible absorbing set with respect to σ if
there does not exist a strict subset S′ of S such that S′ is an absorbing
set with respect to σ. In other words, an irreducible absorbing set S
with respect to profile σ contains all initial states such that once the
path of play enters S, it never leaves the S and every state in S is
reached with positive probability from some other state in S. My focus
is on equilibria with irreducible absorbing sets that guarantee minority
rights. The next definition states this formally.
Definition 1. An equilibrium σ is a minority-rights equilibrium if all
its of irreducible absorbing sets perpetuate the right, that is, for all irre-
ducible absorbing sets S with respect to σ and all s ∈ S, rrp(s;σ) = R.
In other words, a minority-rights equilibrium ensures that if enough
time passes the legislature adopts the right and perpetuates it in every
proceeding period. This equilibrium concept is important for two
reasons. First, a minority-rights equilibrium eventually perpetuates
the right regardless of the initial state of the legislature. Thus, the
path of play must enter an irreducible absorbing set in which legislators
never remove the right. Second, in all other equilibria, there exists an
initial state of the legislature such that if the path of play of begins in
this state, the legislature never perpetuates the right indefinitely, i.e.,
the right vanishes along the path of play — potentially to reappear in
future sessions. Thus, an analysis of minority-rights equilibria and their
existence reveals when the legislature must perpetuate the right and
when the right can be transitory.
4 Results
This section presents the main result of the paper: when rules persist
and the probability of retaining a majority status is sufficiently small,
the majority party first implements and then perpetuates the minority
right. The result makes use of two preliminary lemmas, the intuition
for which is straightforward, so formal proofs are omitted.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the following hold in every policy stage:
1. with majority dominance, the policy outcome is the majority
leader’s instantaneous ideal point;
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2. with the minority right, the policy outcome is the median’s instan-
taneous ideal point;
3. with the minority right, the majority leader proposes the median’s
instantaneous ideal point.
The key to the intuition behind Lemma 1 is that current policies do
not affect future payoffs because the default policy is constant in every
state. Therefore, the policy outcome must be the majority leader’s ideal
point under majority dominance, as is standard in Romer-Rosenthal
bargaining with a bad status-quo. Likewise, if the policy outcome is
not the median’s ideal point under the minority right, then either the
majority or the minority leader has a profitable deviation by proposing
such a policy, a result which does not depend on the status-quo policy
due to the one-dimensional policy space. Now consider the sub-game in
which the minority right is in place and the majority leader proposes a
policy between her and the median’s ideal points. Then the minority
leader can extract some policy concessions from the median using her
amendment powers. To prevent this, the majority leader proposes
the median’s ideal point under the open procedure in any equilibrium.
Because the right drives policy to the median, the moderate Legislators 2
and 3 strictly prefer the minority right over majority dominance. The
next result states this formally.
Lemma 2. Moderate medians strictly prefer the minority right in
equilibrium.
In any equilibrium, policy outcomes must be the majority leader’s
ideal point under majority dominance and the median’s under the
minority right by Lemma 1. Because the right only affects the policy
payoffs under divided majorities, and in these cases the rule moves
policy closer to the moderate median, the moderates can do no better
than by instituting the right. They further receive strictly higher payoffs
when they are themselves the median.10
Moderates’ preference for open rules rather than closed ones is dis-
cussed in Binder (1997), Krehbiel and Meirowitz (2002), and Schickler
10Notice this result still holds when the status-quo, x¯, resides in the unit interval
as long x¯ is not located at a median’s ideal point.
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(2000), among others, and the two lemmas capture a similar logic. Fur-
thermore, Lemma 2 demonstrates that when leaders must bargain with
their more moderate copartisans over procedural changes, the moderates
protect the right from an opportunistic leadership. Essentially, divided
majorities never revoke the minority right, and this makes minority
rights and their moderating benefits credible which drives the main
result, stated as follows.
Proposition 1. There exist bounds p+ and p∗ on the probability of
retaining a majority, p, such that 34 < p
+ < p∗ < 1 and the following
hold.
1. If p < p∗, a minority-rights equilibrium exists. If p > p∗, no
equilibrium with an irreducible absorbing set that perpetuates the
right exists.
2. Leaders proposing majority dominance in every procedural stage
is an equilibrium if and only if p ≥ p+.
The Appendix contains the proof of this result and a detailed
construction of minority-rights equilibria when p < p∗. In addition,
Figure 5 provides an illustration of the main result. Most importantly,
the proposition states that a minority-rights equilibrium exists if and
essentially only if the probability of retaining a majority is not too
large (p < p∗). Furthermore, when p < p+, the last result implies that,
in every equilibrium, the right must be proposed in some initial state
of the legislature. In contrast, when p > p∗, the legislature can never
p
1p*3
4
p+
A minority-rights
equilibrium exists. The right is transitory.
Never propose the right
is an equilibrium.
The right is proposed in some
state in every equilibrium.
Figure 5: A summary of the main result in Proposition 1.
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perpetuate the right in any equilibrium, including a minority-rights
equilibrium.
Thus, the model generates fairly sharp predictions about the exis-
tence and endurance of minority rights when the probability of retaining
a majority is sufficiently large or small, i.e., p < p+ and p > p∗, but
these predictions are less sharp when p ∈ (p+, p∗). However, even in this
part of the parameter space there are reasons to suspect that legislators
coordinate on a minority-rights equilibrium. When the majority is
unified, all four legislators have larger dynamic utilities in a minority-
rights equilibrium than in the equilibrium in which the right is never
proposed. More generally, if the path of play were to get caught in an
irreducible absorbing set in which the right is not perpetuated, Legisla-
tors 2 and 3 strictly prefer the stream of policies from a minority-rights
equilibrium’s unique irreducible absorbing set to the current one. This
means that eventually a legislative majority prefers the absorbing set
in minority-rights equilibria to those that do not perpetuate the right.
Notice the bounds p+ and p∗ are bounded below by 34 , which indicates
that the majority leader must have a large retention probability before
minority-rights equilibria cannot exist, and this specific bound is a direct
result of the quadratic utilities. If, for example, stage utilities were
ui = −|x− xˆi|λ, this bound is strictly increasing in λ, and λ = 1 implies
p∗ and p+ reduce to 12 .
11 In other words, while quadratic utilities are
not necessary for the mechanism, sufficient risk aversion is required for
safe majorities to institute the right.
The bounds p+ and p∗ are functions of party heterogeneity d, party
strength q, and the patience of legislators, δ. Party heterogeneity affects
the bounds because the distance d represents the benefits of instituting
the right when a minority leader faces a divided majority and the cost
when a majority leader oversees a divided majority. Party strength
also affects the bounds because strong parties give the right little
moderating benefits in future periods, thereby providing less incentive
for the leadership to institute the right. Finally, as legislators become
more patient, they internalize their chances of becoming the minority,
regardless of how small the probability is. These relationships allow
comparative statics on the bounds to illustrate the effect of the three
11Though such a set-up is potentially inconsistent with the representative-actor
interpretation of the model, which requires quadratic utilities.
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parameters on the existence of a minority-rights equilibrium. The next
proposition states these formally.
Proposition 2. 1. The bounds p∗ and p+ are increasing in legis-
lators’ patience, δ, and decreasing in party heterogeneity, d. In
addition p+ is decreasing in party strength, q, and p∗ is constant
in q.
2. For every fixed p, if party heterogeneity is sufficiently small, then
a minority-rights equilibrium exists, and in every equilibrium the
minority right must be implemented in some initial states.
Although changes in patience, party strength, and party homogene-
ity all affect the likelihood that a minority-rights equilibrium exists,
Proposition 2 reveals that party heterogeneity is particularly impor-
tant. As party heterogeneity decreases, a minority-rights equilibrium is
guaranteed to exist, and in every equilibrium a majority leader must
propose the minority right. Intuitively, as heterogeneity d approaches
0, the majority leader’s cost of implementing minority rights under a
divided majority goes to zero, but, because legislators are risk averse,
the expected benefits of implementing minority rights decrease at a
slower rate.12 However, the other two parameters do not have such
a substantial effect. For example, p∗ does not depend on q. In addi-
tion, as the legislators become perfectly patient, i.e., δ approaches 1,
p∗ converges to 1, so a minority-rights equilibrium exits. Nonetheless,
p+ remains bounded strictly below 1, so there also exists an equilibrium
in which the leaders never propose the right.
Before proceeding to the next section, I briefly comment on how the
results in Proposition 1 remain robust to three changes in the model.
First, it could be the case that the legislature uses a super-majority
voting rule. To accommodate this possibility, I could incorporate two
super-majority pivots for every possible median. Policy outcomes when
the majority is unified would remain unchanged, and policy outcomes
for divided majorities would be either the ideal point of the pivot closest
to the majority leader or the leader’s ideal point itself. This, however, is
equivalent to reducing d in the model. Furthermore, Proposition 2 then
12Obviously, when d = 0, a minority-rights equilibrium and an equilibrium in
which the right is never proposed exist because the right does not change current or
future policy outcomes.
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suggests that super-majority rules themselves encourage minority rights
because they have a similar effect to decreasing party heterogeneity.
Second, it could also be the case legislators who are more extreme
than the leaders make policy proposals. More specifically, with probabil-
ity pi, the majority leader proposes in the policy stage as in the baseline
model, but with probability 1 − pi, a legislator more extreme makes
the proposal. That is, when Legislator 1 (4) is the majority leader,
a legislator with ideal point xˆ0 < xˆ1 (xˆ5 > xˆ4) proposes policy with
probability 1− pi. Furthermore, assume that the result of this lottery
over proposers is unknown to the majority leader during the procedural
stage. Note that this extension does not affect policy outcomes when
the right is in place but actually moves policy away from the leader’s
ideal with positive probability under majority dominance. This means
that smaller values pi further encourage leaders to institute the right (p∗
and p+ are increasing in pi) because the possibility of extreme proposers
decreases their agenda-setting benefits under majority dominance and
the right still moderates policy when extremists propose.
Third, the main result also holds if the minority right were replaced
with another procedure that allocates sole proposal power to the leg-
islative median rather than the party leaders. In fact, the logic of my
framework explains why majority leaders would delegate to or create
proposal power for their more moderate copartisans. This suggests one
reason why the legislative leadership does not fully monopolize proposal
power even when such a monopoly is theoretically possible. Comparing
these two types of procedures, i.e., assigning amendment power to the
minority versus to moderate copartisans, demonstrates when minority
rights substantively change policies: The moderate members of the
majority party cannot construct bills or offer amendments. This speaks
to a debate in the Congressional literature over whether the motion to
recommit in the House affects policies (Krehbiel and Meirowitz, 2002;
Roberts, 2005; Wolfensberger, 2007) and reflects a similar result in
Roust (2005) who finds that motion-to-recommit amendments are never
adopted along the path of play if open rules were previously used in the
policy-making stage.
One reason why the two procedures in the preceding paragraph
produce identical policy outcomes is the bad status-quo assumption in a
one-dimensional policy space. This forces all proposers to have the same
preference for policies between the two leader’s ideal points over the
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default policy x¯. When x¯ consistently favors one party, say x¯ resides in
(0, xˆ2), for example, this encourages Leader 1 to introduce the minority
right because her agenda-setting advantage under majority dominance
is now diminished. Now, Leader 4 knows her opponent is more likely
to introduce the right, reducing her incentives to do so, which suggests
moderate default policies make minority-rights equilibria more difficult
to sustain. Nonetheless, this relationship is an artifact of the asymmetry
in the constant default policy. In the proceeding section, I address this
issue by analyzing the model with persistent policies, a more realistic
way to incorporate moderate status-quos.
5 Necessity of Procedural Persistence
In this section, I consider whether the mechanism underlying the previ-
ous results is robust to exogenous default rules and persistent policies.
For example, the House cannot proceed to its policy-making capacity
without first passing a set of rules, and this organizational structure
may remove the possibility that rules carry over from session to session.
Likewise, when policies persist, the policy enacted today becomes the
status-quo or default policy tomorrow, and legislators do not always face
a bad or constant status-quo as assumed in the previous section. The
results in this section demonstrate necessity of procedural persistence
for minority rights to appear. More specifically, when rules do not
persist, the minority right cannot substantively affect policy outcomes,
and when rules and policies persist, equilibria similar to those in the
previous section exist in a reasonable set of parameters.
To investigate these versions of the model, I need the following
notation and terminology. Let x¯t denote the default or status-quo
policy in period t. Now, initial states of the legislature take the form
srp = (x¯, r¯, µ), and the remaining states require a similar modifica-
tion.13 The first variation I consider is that the default rule in every
procedural state is majority dominance but policies persist.14 Formally,
13These states and associated expected utility calculations are described in the
Appendix.
14If the default rule is majority dominance and policies do not persist, the
equilibrium is trivial: majority leaders never introduce the right when majority is
divided, and they are indifferent between the right and majority dominance when
the majority is unified.
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r¯t = ¬R and x¯t+1 = xt for all periods t ≥ 1.15 To see how the minority
right affects policy outcomes with these transitions, first consider the
definition of “policy equivalence” that is similar to the concept of payoff
equivalence.
Definition 2. Two strategy profiles σ and σ′ are policy equivalent if,
for all srp ∈ Srp, xrp(srp;σ) = xrp(srp;σ′).
In words, the definition says that two strategy profiles are policy
equivalent if, for all initial states, the policies produced under the two
strategy profiles are the same regardless of the rules enacted. Because
the policy outcomes associated with all states are the same, two policy-
equivalent profiles are payoff equivalent. Proposition 3 states the main
result when rules do not persist.
Proposition 3. Assume that majority dominance is the default rule
in every period and policies persist. For every equilibrium in which
a majority leader proposes the minority right in some initial state of
the legislature, there exists a policy-equivalent equilibrium such that the
leader proposes majority dominance in the same state.
In other words, the minority does not substantively influence policies
in equilibrium even if the right is present. Furthermore, the proposition
immediately implies that for every minority-rights equilibrium, there
exists a policy-equivalent equilibrium in which majority leaders never
propose the right. The key to understand the result is that policy
outcomes solely determine a legislator’s expected utility in future periods
regardless of the rule adopted in any procedural stage. Thus, when
two equilibria are policy equivalent, they produce the same expected
utilities for every legislator even though they may involve different rules.
Because of this, the minority right cannot lead to better outcomes for
the leadership when the default rule is majority dominance because, if
it did, the majority leader could always enforce majority dominance
and propose the other outcome.
Note that Proposition 3 demonstrates that minority rights do not
substantively affect policy outcomes even when policies persist. To
show that procedural persistence still encourages minority rights in this
15Note that policy persistence is the standard in legislative bargaining with an
endogenous status-quo (e.g., Baron, 1996; Kalandrakis, 2004).
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more complicated setting, I also consider the case where both rules
and policies persist, that is, r¯t+1 = r¯t and x¯t+1 = xt for periods t ≥ 1.
Essentially, this variation relaxes the assumption of a bad status-quo
in the baseline model. However, the analysis is complicated by the
continuous nature of the default policy state variable. As is common
in bargaining models, this leads to equilibria involving expected utility
functions that are neither quasi-concave nor continuous in the policy
outcome x (Baron, 1996; Duggan and Kalandrakis, 2012; Kalandrakis,
2004; Zapal, 2011). Because of this, the proceeding result limits the
parameter space under consideration, e.g., p > 12 and d is not too small,
although no such restrictions on δ are necessary. In other words, the
next proposition demonstrates that even with an electoral advantage,
the majority leadership can still introduce and maintain the minority
right.
Proposition 4. When rules and policies persist, there exists a minority-
rights equilibrium in an open, non-empty set of parameters which does
not depend on the discount factor, δ, and requires that the probability
of retaining a majority is sufficiently large, i.e., p > 1/2. Furthermore,
the equilibrium has the following properties:
• Leaders propose the right only when the majority is unified or the
status-quo policy is sufficiently close to their respective moderate
copartisan.
• Once the minority right is adopted, it is never revoked.
• Policy outcomes follow the median’s ideal point when the legislature
adopts the minority right.
• The majority leader engages in Romer–Rosenthal bargaining with
the median before the minority right is adopted.
The specifics of the constructed equilibrium are in the Supplementary
Information. In other words, Proposition 4 serves as a possibility result
that the mechanism advanced in the previous sections is not affected
when both rules and policies persist. Notice that the characterized
equilibrium is quite similar to those in the previous section. However,
there is an important modification to previous procedural strategies:
both leaders propose the right when the majority is divided and the
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status quo is sufficiently close to their respective copartisan’s ideal point.
Essentially, moderate default policies also encourage a leader to propose
minority rights with persistent rules and policies. This result contrasts
with the discussion in the previous section, but the difference emerges
because this extension does not force an asymmetric advantage in the
default policy.
Taken together, these two results demonstrate the necessity of proce-
dural persistence for minority rights to endure in legislatures and affect
policy regardless of whether policies persist. More substantively, they
suggest that even if formal minority rights exist in some legislatures,
policies are immune from minority influence when rules do not persist.
This relates to arguments in others studies on the House that connect
the ability of the majority party to influence policies to its procedural
dominance (Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 2005). Without procedural
persistence, the right no longer affects the long-term calculations of
the leaders as any majority leader can ensure her monopoly over the
legislative agenda even in the presence of a moderate decisive legisla-
tor. More broadly, the stark contrast between Propositions 1 and 3
demonstrates the importance of procedural persistence when explaining
inclusive policy-making processes and political compromises.
6 Conclusion
Legislative majorities often grant their minority counterparts significant
rights to influence the policy-making process. One such right is the
ability to amend bills subject to a majority vote. However, when
legislators are purely policy motivated and cannot use punishment
strategies, the emergence and endurance of these rights is not well
understood in a bargaining framework, especially with cohesive and
polarized parties or coalitions. Accounting for these considerations,
I present a theory of minority rights that demonstrates why unified
majorities perpetuate rules that grant the minority some agenda control.
Unified majorities implement minority rights in order to moderate future
policy outcomes when rules are persistent and there is uncertainty over
their future majority status. These rights become permanent because
moderate legislators benefit from competing policy proposals and defend
these rights. Procedural persistence is a necessary requirement for
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minority rights to emerge in this framework. These results differ from
previous accounts of endogenous proposal powers and demonstrate the
importance of procedural persistence when explaining the development
of inclusive political institutions.
In the bigger picture, the analysis here takes a first step toward
explaining the emergence of amendment agendas and examining a
legislative bargaining framework in which the decisive legislator changes
over time. In addition, the theory also generates a rich set of comparative
statics and empirical implications:
• As the probability of retaining a majority decreases, majority
parties are more likely to introduce minority rights.
• If legislators’ discount factors positively correlate with incumbency
advantages or reelection rates, then larger incumbency advantages
promote the adoption of minority rights.
• Weak parties, super-majority voting rules, extreme proposers, and
moderate status-quo policies encourage minority rights.
In sum, the theory explains the endogenous creation and mainte-
nance of legislative rules that moderate policy outcomes, which means
the mechanism can easily be extended to explain minority rights such
as resources to buy votes as in Krehbiel et al. (2015). Nonetheless,
difficulties emerge in explaining rights that do not necessarily moder-
ate policies such as obstructionism. Analyzing the emergence of this
right requires characterizing, either by assumption or within an equilib-
rium, the distribution of status-quo policies. If these policies are close
to the moderate legislators, then similar results would hold because
obstructionism moderates policies. If these policies are extreme, moder-
ate, decisive legislators may not always prefer the right, and therefore,
members of the legislative majority face a more complicated strategic
environment when creating a right to obstruct.
Appendix
Expected Utilities and Equilibria
I define Ugi (a, s
g;σ) as i’s expected utility of action a at decision g ∈ G
given state sg and strategy profile σ. Recall that xg(sg;σ) and rg(sg;σ)
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denote the respective policy and procedural outcomes given decision-
relevant state sg and strategy profile σ. Below, I use a to denote an
arbitrary action from a discrete action set and x to denote one from a
continuous set.
We can write
UMci (a
Mc, sMc;σ) = Umci (a
mc, smc;σ) =

Ui(x
p, r, µ;σ), if a = cp
Ui(x
a, r, µ;σ), if a = ca
Ui(x¯, r, µ;σ), if a = cq.
(2)
for all sMc ∈ SMc, all smc ∈ Smc, all aMc ∈ AMc, all amc ∈ Amc and all
i = 2, 3. At the minority’s amendment proposal, we write
Uapi (x, s
ap;σ) = Ui(x
mc(µ, xp, x;σ), R, µ;σ) (3)
for all x ∈ Aap, all sap ∈ Sap, and all i = 1, 4. At the majority’s proposal
decision, we write
Uppi (x, s
ap;σ) = Ui(x
ap(r, µ, x;σ), rap(r, µ, x;σ), µ;σ) (4)
for all x ∈ App, all sap ∈ Sap, and all i = 1, 4. At the median’s decision
to accept a rule’s proposal, we can write
U rci (a, s
rc;σ) = Ui(x
pp(arp + (1− a)r¯, µ;σ),
rpp(arp + (1− a)r¯, µ;σ), µ;σ). (5)
for all a ∈ Arc = {0, 1}, all src ∈ Src and all i = 2, 3. At the majority’s
rule proposal, we write
U rpi (a, s
rp;σ) = Ui(x
rc(r¯, µ, a;σ), rrc(r¯, µ, a;σ), µ;σ) (6)
for all a ∈ {¬R,R}, all srp ∈ Srp, and all i = 1, 4.
With this notation in hand, the next definition states the sub-game
perfect equilibrium concept which precludes profitable deviations at
each decision node.
Definition 3. A strategy profile σ is an equilibrium if
Ugi (σ
g
i (s
g), sg;σ) ≥ Ugi (a, sg;σ)
for all g ∈ G, all sg ∈ Sg, all a ∈ Ag and all i ∈ N .
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Proof of Proposition 3. Define the following:
p+ =
2− d(1 + (1− q)δ)
2− 2d(1− q)δ ,
p− =
−d+ (2− d)(1− q)δ
2(1− d)(1− q)δ
and
p∗ =
2− d(1 + δ)
2− 2dδ .
With some algebra, it can be shown that 34 < p
+ < p∗ < 1 and the
interval [p−, p+] is non-empty. To prove Proposition 1, we first state an
expanded version.
Proposition 1 (Expanded). There exist bounds p−, p+, and p∗ on the
probability of retaining a majority, p, such that 3/4 < p+ < p∗ < 1,
p− < p+, and the following hold.
1. If p < p∗, a minority-rights equilibrium exists. If p > p∗, no
equilibrium with an irreducible absorbing set that perpetuates the
right exists.
2. Leaders proposing majority dominance in every procedural stage
is an equilibrium if and only if p ≥ p+.
3. A minority-rights equilibrium in which only unified majorities
propose the right exists if and only if p− ≤ p ≤ p+.
4. There exists a minority-rights equilibrium in mixed strategies when
p < p− in which unified majorities always propose the right and
divided ones propose the right with probability strictly between 0
and 1.
5. There exists a minority-rights equilibrium in mixed strategies
when p ∈ (p+, p∗) in which unified majorities propose the right
with probability strictly between 0 and 1 and divided ones never
propose the right.
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Proof of Proposition 1(Expanded)(1). Note that Proposition 1(Expan-
ded)(3–5) demonstrates that a minority-rights equilibrium exists if
p < p∗. We prove these below. For present purposes, it suffices to
show that if p > p∗, then there does not exist an equilibrium σ with an
irreducible absorbing set S that perpetuates the right, i.e., rrg(s;σ) = R
for all s ∈ S. To see this, suppose, contrary. Then there exists an
irreducible absorbing set {(x0, R, 1), . . . , (x0, R, 4)}, and the expected
utility of these four states are given by the system of equations:
U1(0, R, 1;σ) = δ(pqU1(0, R, 1;σ) + p(1− q)U1(d,R, 2;σ)
+ (1− p)qU1(1, R, 4;σ)
+ (1− p)(1− q)U1(1− d,R, 3;σ)), (7)
U1(d,R, 2;σ) = −d2 + U1(0, R, 1;σ), (8)
U1(1, R, 4;σ) = −1 + δ(pqU1(1, R, 4;σ) + p(1− q)U1(1− d,R, 3;σ)
+ (1− p)qU1(0, R, 1;σ)
+ (1− p)(1− q)U1(1− d,R, 3;σ)), (9)
and
U1(1− d,R, 3;σ) = 1− (1− d)2 + U1(1, R, 4;σ). (10)
Solving reveals,
U1(0, R, 1;σ) = −δ(1−p−2d(1− p)(1− q) + d
2(1− q)(1 + (1− 2p)δ))
(1− δ)(1 + (1− 2p)δ) ,
U1(1, R, 4;σ) =
−1 + δ(p− d(1− q)(d− 2p− (2− d)(1− 2p)δ))
(1− δ)(1 + (1− 2p)δ) ,
and
U1(d,R, 2;σ)
=
−d2(1 + (1− 2p)δ)(1− qδ) + 2d(1− p)(1− q)δ − (1− p)δ
(1− δ)(1 + (1− 2p)δ) .
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Furthermore, it must be the case that
σrpi (R, i) = R
for i = 1, 4 or else {(x0, R, 1), . . . , (x0, R, 4)} would not be an irreducible
set. In addition, we require that there exist srp = (r¯, µ) ∈ Srp such that
r¯ = ¬R and either σrp1 (srp) = R and µ ∈ {1, 2} or σrp4 (srp) = R and
µ ∈ {3, 4}. Without loss of generality, suppose the former. Because σ
is an equilibrium, we require U rp(¬R, srp;σ) ≤ U rp(R, srp;σ).
Now, Leader 1’s expected utility of retaining majority dominance in
a minority-rights equilibrium and in state srp ∈ Srp is minimized when
σrp4 (s
rp′) = ¬R for all srp′ ∈ Srp\{(R, 4)}. (The state (R, 4) needs to be
excluded or else there would be no absorbing set in which only the minor-
ity is implemented.) So assume that is the case. Furthermore, Leader 1’s
expected utility of implementing the minority right is maximized when
she does this with a unified party, i.e., µ = i, and she proposes majority
dominance with a divided party. Again, suppose this is the case. We
now show that even under these most favorable conditions, Leader 1
can profitably deviate by not offering minority rights in state (¬R, 1),
that is, we show U rp(¬R, (¬R, 1);σ) > U rp(R, (¬R, 1);σ).
To see this, we can consider the expected utility of Legislator 1
implementing ¬R in the state srp = (¬R, 1) and then immediately
return to a strategy in which she only proposes the minority right when
unified. By Lemma 1, she would receive
U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) = δ(pqU1(0, R, 1;σ) + p(1− q)U1(0,¬R, 1;σ)
+ (1− p)U1(0,¬R, j;σ)),
and
U1(0,¬R, j;σ) = −1 + δ(pU1(0,¬R, j;σ) + (1− p)qU1(0, R, 1;σ)
+ (1− p)(1− q)U1(0,¬R, 1;σ)),
where j ∈ {3, 4}. Solving these two equations give us
U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) = δ1− p(1 + qU1(0, R, 1;σ))− (1− 2p)qδU1(0, R, 1;σ)−1 + p(2− q)δ + (1− 2p)(1− q)δ2
(11)
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For Leader 1 to not have a profitable deviation in state srp = (R, 1), we
require
U1(0, R, 1;σ)− U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ −d(1− q)δ(2− 2p− d(1 + (1− 2p)δ))−1 + p(2− q)δ + (1− 2p)(1− q)δ2 ≥ 0
⇐⇒ p ≤ 2− d(1 + δ)
2− 2dδ = p
∗,
but this cannot be the case because p > p∗.
Proof of Proposition 1 (Expanded)(2). Consider a strategy profile σ
such that σrpi (s
rp) = ¬R for all srp ∈ Srp. Suppose σ is an equi-
librium. We must verify that U rpi (¬R, srp;σ) ≥ U rpi (R, srp;σ) for all
i = 1, 4 and all srp ∈ Srp. We only prove this for leader 1 as the
condition for leader 4 is symmetric. Three observations help in the
proof. First, if σ is an equilibrium, the condition indeed holds for srp
in which r¯ = R and µ = 2 because the procedural outcome will be R
regardless of leader 1’s strategy. This follows from Lemma 2. Second,
we need only verify the inequality in states such that µ = 1. If the
condition holds in these states, it will also hold in states with median
µ = 2 because U rp1 (R, (¬R, 1);σ) > U rp1 (R, (¬R, 2);σ) when the leader
must incur an immediate policy loss from implementing the minority
right. Finally, these two comments and Lemma 1 imply that it suffices
to show that U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) ≥ U1(0, R, 1;σ).
We can write the expected utility of Leader 1 from following σ in a
state srp such that µ = 1 and r¯ = ¬R as
U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) = δ(pqU1(0,¬R, 1;σ) + p(1− q)U1(0,¬R, 2;σ)
+ (1− p)qU1(1,¬R, 4;σ)
+ (1− p)(1− q)U1(1,¬R, 3;σ))
and
U1(1,¬R, 4;σ) = −1 + δ(pqU1(1,¬R, 4;σ) + p(1− q)U1(1,¬R, 3;σ)
+ (1− p)qU1(0,¬R, 1;σ)
+ (1− p)(1− q)U1(0,¬R, 2;σ)).
306 Gibilisco
Because the immediate policy payoffs and transition probabilities are
identical, U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) = U1(0,¬R, 2;σ) and U1(1,¬R, 4;σ) =
U1(1,¬R, 3;σ). Solving reveals
U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) = −δ(1− p)
(1− δ)(1 + (1− 2p)δ)
and
U1(1,¬R, 4;σ) = −1 + pδ
(1− δ)(1 + (1− 2p)δ)
Now suppose Leader 1 were to deviate by offering R and immediately
return to playing σ when she is the median, i.e., µ = 1. The expected
utility of the deviation is
U1(0, R, 1;σ) = δ(pqU1(0,¬R, 1;σ) + p(1− q)U1(d,R, 2;σ)
+ (1− p)qU1(1,¬R, 4;σ)
+ (1− p)(1− q)U1(1− d,R, 3;σ)),
where
U1(d,R, 2;σ) = −d2 + U1(0, R, 1;σ)
and
U1(1− d,R, 3;σ) = −(1− d)2 + δ(pqU1(1,¬R, 4;σ)
+ p(1− q)U1(1− d,R, 3;σ)
+ (1− p)qU1(0,¬R, 1;σ)
+ (1− p)(1− q)U1(d,R, 2;σ)).
Solving gives us
U1(0, R, 1;σ) =
−(1− q)δ(1− p− d(2− 2p− d(1 + (1− 2p)(1− q)δ)))
1− (1− q)δ(2p+ (1− 2p)(1− q)δ)
+ δU1(0,¬R, 1;σ) q(p+ (1− 2p)(1− q)δ)
1− (1− q)δ(2p+ (1− 2p)(1− q)δ)
+ δU1(1,¬R, 4;σ) q(1− p)
1− (1− q)δ(2p+ (1− 2p)(1− q)δ) .
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We require
U1(0,¬R, 1;σ)− U1(0, R, 1;σ) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ d
(
−d+ d− 1
1− (1− q)δ +
1
1 + (1− 2p)(1− q)δ
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ p ≥ 2− d(1 + (1− q)δ)
2 + 2d(1− q)δ = p
+.
Existence is by construction. In the policy stage with minority right,
Legislators 2 and 3 choose the policy that maximizes their instantaneous
utilities u2 and u3, but they defer to the minority leader when indifferent
between the two leaders’ proposals. Specifically, for i = 2, 3
σMci (s
Mc) = σmci (s
mc) =

ca, if xa ∈ arg maxx′∈{x¯,xp,xa} ui(x′)
cp, if xp ∈ arg maxx′∈{x¯,xp,xa} ui(x′)
and xa /∈ arg maxx′∈{x¯,xp,xa} ui(x′)
cq, otherwise.
The minority leader proposes a policy that maximizes her instantaneous
payoffs subject to the majority leader’s proposal. For example, we can
write
σˆap1 (s
ap) =
{
0, if |xˆ1 − xˆµ| ≤ |xp − xˆµ|
µ− |xp − xˆµ|, otherwise
for 1 when she is the minority leader, and
σˆap4 (s
ap) =
{
1, if |xˆ4 − xˆµ| ≤ |xp − xˆµ|
µ+ |xp − xˆµ|, otherwise
for Leader 4. Under a policy stage with the right, the majority leader
should always propose the median’s ideal policy. That is, σppi (s
pp) = xˆµ
for leaders i = 1, 4 and spp ∈ Spp such that r = R. So, there is no
profitable deviation in a policy stage with the right. Under majority
dominance, the majority leader proposes her ideal point, i.e., σppi (s
pp) =
xˆi for i = 1, 4 and spp ∈ Spp such that r = ¬R. This is identical to a
repeated Romer–Rosenthal bargaining game, so there is no profitable
deviation. In the procedural stage, we need the moderate medians
i = 2, 3 to accept a procedural proposal if and only if the proposal
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is the minority right. Finally, the leaders should never propose the
right. When the default rule is R and the majority is divided, the
leader cannot change the proceeding policy outcome regardless of her
proposal. When the default rule is ¬R, we only need to rule out
profitable deviations when the leaders are the median, because this
will also rule out profitable deviations when they control a divided
majority. By the previous discussion, this means we need to verify
U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) ≥ U1(0, R, 1;σ), but this inequality holds precisely when
p ≥ p+.
Proof of Proposition 1(Expanded)(3). Consider a strategy profile σ such
that σrpi (s
rp) = R if µ = i and σrpi (s
rp) = ¬R otherwise for leaders
i = 1, 4 Suppose σ is an equilibrium and p ∈ [p−, p+]. We must ver-
ify that for i = 1, 4, U rpi (R, s
rp;σ) ≥ U rpi (¬R, srp;σ) for all srp ∈ Srp
such that µ = i and U rpi (¬R, srp;σ) ≥ U rpi (R, srp;σ) for all srp ∈ Srp
such that µ 6= i.
Note that U rpi (r
p, srp;σ) = U rpi (r
p, srp
′
;σ) for two state srp and
srp
′ such that i = µ = µ′ because the leader’s rule choice will always
be implemented. Further when the state srp is such that r¯ = R and
µ 6= i, the rule proposal will not have an effect on the subsequent policy
outcome because right will remain in effect. Using Lemmas 1 and 2
and symmetry, it now suffices to show U1(0, R, 1;σ) ≥ U1(0,¬R, 1;σ)
and U1(0,¬R, 2;σ) ≥ U1(d,R, 2;σ). The values U1(0, R, 1;σ) and
U1(d,R, 2;σ) are those that solve Equations (8)–(10).
First we verify U1(0, R, 1;σ) ≥ U1(0,¬R, 1;σ). Suppose Leader 1
deviates by enforcing ¬R in a procedural period in which she is the
median and then immediately returns to strategy σ. The outcome of
the policy stage would be 0, and majority dominance would remain in
place as long as the majority party remains divided. Therefore, we can
compute the expected utility of her deviation as follows. Write
U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) = δ(pqU1(0, R, 1;σ) + p(1− q)U1(0,¬R, 2;σ)
+ (1− p)qU1(1, R, 4;σ)
+ (1− p)(1− q)U1(1,¬R, 3;σ)),
where
U1(1,¬R, 3;σ) = −1 + δ(pqU1(1, R, 4;σ) + p(1− q)U1(1,¬R, 3;σ)
+ (1− p)qU1(0, R, 1;σ)
+ (1− p)(1− q)U1(0,¬R, 2;σ)).
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Note that U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) = U1(0, R, 2;σ) because the median only
influences transition probabilities, which vary by majority/minority
status. Solving, we can write
U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) =
δ(1− p)(−1 + q + U1(1, R, 4;σ))
+ δqU1(0, R, 1;σ)(p+ (1− 2p)(1− q)δ)
1− (1− q)δ(2p+ (1− 2p)(1− q)δ) .
Because σ is an equilibrium, we require
U1(0, R, 1;σ)− U1(0,¬R, 1;σ) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ d
(
−d+ d− 1
1− (1− q)δ +
1
1 + (1− 2p)(1− q)δ
)
≥ 0
⇐⇒ p ≤ 2− d(1 + (1− q)δ)
2 + 2d(1− q)δ = p
+,
as required.
Second, we characterize the conditions under which U1(0,¬R, 2;σ) ≥
U1(d,R, 2;σ). To compute U1(0,¬R, 2;σ), we write
U1(0,¬R, 2;σ) = δ(pqU1(0, R, 1;σ) + p(1− q)U1(0,¬R, 2;σ)
+ (1−p)qU1(1, R, 4;σ) + (1−p)(1−q)U1(1,¬R, 3;σ))
= U1(0,¬R, 1;σ).
So we require
U1(0,¬R, 1;σ)− U1(d,R, 2;σ) ≥ 0
⇐⇒ −1 + d
1− (1− q)δ +
1
1 + (1− 2p)(1− q)δ ≥ 0
⇐⇒ p ≥ −d+ (2− d)(1− q)δ
2(1− d)(1− q)δ = p
−
Existence follows from construction, and the construction is similar
to the one in the previous proof.
Proof of Proposition 1(Expanded)(4). I first introduce mixed strategies
in the procedural stage and show how to calculate expected utilities
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under mixed strategies. A mixed rule proposal strategy for legislator
i = 1, 4 is a function γrpi : S
rp → [0, 1] such that γrpi (srp) denotes
the probability with which leader i proposes the minority right. In a
slight abuse of notation, a strategy for i = 1, 4 becomes a three-tuple
σi = (γ
rp
i , σ
pp
i , σ
ap
i ). The strategy for i = 2, 3 remains unchanged.
Given strategy profile σ and some initial state srp, there exists a
probability function p˜i over potential procedural outcomes and policy
outcomes, where p˜i(x, r|srp;σ) denotes the probability that policy x and
rule r are implemented give state srp, and strategy profile σ. This is
a probability function because there are a finite number of rules and
actors employ pure strategies in the policy stage. Let Sp˜iσ(srp) denote
the support of p˜i with initial state srp and strategy profile σ. We can
write expected utility calculations as follows
Ui(x, r, µ;σ) = ui(x) + δ
∑
µ′∈N
pi(µ′|µ)
×
∑
(x′,r′)∈
Sp˜iσ(r,µ′)
p˜i(x′, r′|(r, µ′);σ)Ui(x′, r′, µ′;σ). (12)
For a strategy profile σ to be an equilibrium, we require the condition
in Definition 3 for all pure strategies. However, under mixed strategies,
we require that in any state srp
γrpi (s
rp) ∈ (0, 1) =⇒ U rpi (R, srp;σ) = U rpi (¬R, srp;σ)
and
γrpi (s
rp) = 1(0) =⇒ U rpi (R, srp;σ) ≥ (≤)U rpi (¬R, srp;σ).
To generalize Definition 1 to mixed strategies, say equilibrium σ is
a minority-rights equilibrium if for all irreducible absorbing sets S with
respect to σ and all s ∈ S, if (x′, r′) ∈ Sp˜iσ(s), then r′ = R. With these
primitives, we now prove the claim.
Existence is by construction. Consider a strategy profile σ as in the
proof of Proposition 1(Expanded)(2), except the majority leaders play
the following mixed rule proposal strategy
γrpi (s
rp) =
{
1, if µ = i
γ, if µ 6= i ,
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where γ ∈ (0, 1). Note that because policies are not persistent, there is
no profitable deviation in the policy stage. We must now show there is no
profitable in the procedural stage. Because moderate legislators always
receive (weakly) larger payoffs under the right than majority dominance,
they do not have a profitable deviation from the strategy of accepting
rule proposals if and only if the proposal is the minority right. Thus, it
suffices to show that for the majority leaders i = 1, 4, two conditions
hold: (a) U rpi (R, s
rp;σ) ≥ U rpi (¬R, srp;σ) for all srp ∈ Srp such that
µ = i and (b) U rpi (R, s
rp;σ) = U rpi (¬R, srp;σ) for all srp ∈ Srp such
that i 6= µ. By symmetry, we only need to demonstrate this for i = 1
and µ = 1, 2.
I first claim condition (b) implies condition (a). To see this, suppose
U rp1 (R, s
rp;σ) = U rp1 (¬R, srp;σ) for all srp = (r¯, µ) ∈ Srp such that
µ = 2. If r¯ = R, then the median will reject the proposal ¬R, so the
procedural outcomes are equivalent, which implies U rp1 (R, (R, 2);σ) =
U rp1 (¬R, (R, 2);σ). For some srp such that r¯ = ¬R, note that
U rp1 (R, (¬R, 2);σ) = −d2 + U rp1 (R, (¬R, 1);σ) because only the per-
sistent rule and the current majority party determine future payoffs.
Likewise, U rp1 (¬R, (¬R, 2);σ) = U rp1 (¬R, (¬R, 1);σ). We can now write
U rp1 (R, (¬R, 2);σ) = U rp1 (¬R, (¬R, 2);σ)
⇐⇒ −d2 + U rp1 (R, (¬R, 1);σ)
= U rp1 (¬R, (¬R, 1);σ)
=⇒ U rp1 (R, (¬R, 1);σ) > U rp1 (¬R, (¬R, 1);σ)
⇐⇒ U rp1 (R, (R, 1);σ) > U rp1 (¬R, (R, 1);σ),
where the last biconditional follows because the default rule does not
affect the policy or the procedural outcome when leader 1 controls a
unified majority.
Hence, it suffices to verify condition (b). As before, this must hold
when the default procedure r¯ includes the minority right because the
median will always reject a proposal of ¬R, and accordingly we only
consider the case when r¯ = ¬R. So we must show U1(0,¬R, 2;σ) =
U1(d,R, 2;σ).
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Because the minority right is absorbing with σ, we can write
U1(d,R, 2;σ) using the computations from the previous result. That is,
U1(d,R, 2;σ)
=
−d2(1 + (1− 2p)δ)(1− qδ) + 2d(1− p)(1− q)δ − (1− p)δ
(1− δ)(1 + (1− 2p)δ) .
Define the function F : [0, 1]→ R as
F (γ) = U1(0,¬R, 2;σ)
= δ(p(qU1(0, R, 1;σ) + (1−q)γU1(d,R, 2;σ) + (1−q)(1− γ)F (γ))
+ (1− p)(qU1(1, R, 4;σ)(1− q)γU1(1− d,R, 3;σ)
+ (1− q)(1− γ)U1(1,¬R, 3;σ)))
In this equation, U1(0, R, 1;σ), U1(1, R, 4;σ), and U1(1− d,R, 3;σ) can
be computed using the quantities in the previous result as well.
Next, I claim that when p < p− there exists γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
F (γ∗)−U1(d,R, 2;σ) = 0, which proves (b) when γ = γ∗. To show this,
we demonstrate that F (0)−U1(d,R, 2;σ) < 0 and F (1)−U1(d,R, 2;σ) >
0 and then invoke the intermediate value theorem.
Consider F (0). Then, we can write U1(1,¬R, 3;σ) as
U1(1,¬R, 3;σ) = −1 + δ(pqU1(1, R, 4;σ) + p(1− q)U1(1,¬R, 3;σ)
+ (1− p)qU1(0, R, 1;σ)(1− p)(1− q)F (0))
Solving gives us
F (0) = δ
−1 + p+ q − pq + U1(1, R, 4;σ)q(1− p)
+U1(0, R, 4;σ)q(p+ (1− 2p)(1− q)δ)
1− (1− q)δ(2p+ (1− 2p)(1− q)δ) .
Then, we have
F (0)− U1(d,R, 2;σ) < 0
⇐⇒ d
(
−d+ d− 1
1− (1− q)δ +
1
1 + (1− 2p)(1− q)δ
)
< 0
⇐⇒ p < p−,
as required.
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Next, consider F (1). In this case, every leader is implementing the
right in every subsequent period. Then we have
F (1)− U1(d,R, 2;σ) = U1(0, R, 1;σ) + d2 − U1(0, R, 1;σ) > 0, (13)
as required. Now we invoke the intermediate value theorem to show that
there exists a γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that F (γ∗)− U1(1, R, 3;σ) = 0 because
F (γ) is a polynomial and therefore continuous in γ. When γ = γ∗,
condition (b) holds.
Proof of Proposition 1(Expanded)(5). Existence is by construction and
follows a similar logic as the proof immediately above. Consider a
strategy profile σ defined as follows. In the policy stay, legislators follow
the policy strategies detailed in the proof of Proposition 3(Expanded)(2).
In the procedural stage, moderate legislator’s accept a rule proposal
if and only if it were to implement the minority right. Finally, the
majority leaders plays the following mixed procedural proposal strategy
γrpi (s
rp) =
{
γ, if µ = i
0, if µ 6= i ,
where γ ∈ (0, 1). As before, it suffices to show that the majority leaders
do not have a profitable deviation in the procedural stage. That is, we
must show that for leaders i = 1, 4, (a) U rpi (¬R, srp;σ) ≥ U rpi (R, srp;σ),
for all srp ∈ Srp such that µ 6= i and r¯ = ¬R, and (b) U rpi (R, srp;σ) =
U rpi (¬R, srp;σ) for all srp ∈ Srp such that i = µ. By symmetry, we only
need to demonstrate this for i = 1 and µ = 1, 2.
Next, I claim the condition (b) implies condition (a). To see this,
assume (b). Then we have
U rp1 (¬R, (¬R, 1);σ) = U rp1 (R, (¬R, 1);σ)
⇐⇒ U rp1 (¬R, (¬R, 1);σ)
> −d2 + U rp1 (R, (¬R, 1);σ)
=⇒ U rp1 (¬R, (¬R, 2);σ) > U rp1 (R, (¬R, 2);σ),
and U rp1 (¬R, (x0, R, 2);σ) = U rp1 (R, (x0, R, 2);σ) because the median
always rejects a proposal of ¬R when the default rule is R. Hence, we
only need to verify condition (b) holds. The remainder of the proof
follows the argument in the proof for Proposition 1(Expanded)(4).
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Proof of Proposition 2
In this section, we prove the comparative statics in Proposition 2. Note
that differentiation of p+ and p− prove the first results. We prove the
remaining one.
Proof of Proposition 2(2). Fix some p ∈ (0, 1). By Proposition 2, a
minority-rights equilibrium exists if
p ≤ p+ ⇐⇒ p ≤ 2− d(1 + (1− q)δ)
2− 2d(1− q)δ .
As d converges to 0, p+ converges to 1, which establishes the desired
result.
Proof of Proposition 3
In this section, we first derive expected utilities for a more general state
space. We then prove Proposition 3.
In this version, the state spaces take the following form:
Decision node g State sg ∈ Sg
Rule proposal (rp) (x¯, r¯, µ)
Rule choice (rc) (x¯, r¯, µ, rp)
Policy proposal (pp) (x¯, r, µ)
Amendment proposal (ap) (x¯, µ, xp)
Policy choice with right (mc) (x¯, µ, xp, xa)
Policy choice without right (Mp) (x¯, µ, xp)
which just replicates Table 1 with persistent rules and policies. When
r¯t = ¬R and x¯t = x¯t−1 for all periods t ≥ 1, legislator i’s expected
utility from passing policy x with current rule r and median µ take the
form
Ui(x, r, µ;σ)
= ui(x) + δ
∑
µ′∈N
pi(µ′ | µ)Ui(xrp(x,¬R,µ′;σ), rrp(x,¬R,µ′;σ), µ′;σ).
Using this setup, it is straightforward to define Ugi (a, s
g;σ), or i′ ex-
pected utility of taking action a ∈ Ag at decision node g in state sg.
We now prove Proposition 3.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Consider an equilibrium σ such that σrpi (s
rp) =
R for some leader i and initial state srp = (x¯, r¯, µ). Then xrp(srp;σ) = x
and rrp(srp;σ) = r are the policy and procedural outcomes of this state,
respectively. Construct profile σ¯ as follows. At srp, i proposes ¬R as
the rule, which will be the rule governing the stage. In the policy stage,
i uses strategy σppi (x¯,¬R,µ) = x, i.e., he proposes the policy outcome of
the state under the original equilibrium. Finally, the median accepts the
proposal x when the status quo is x¯ and rule ¬R. All other strategies
remain the same.
I claim that σ¯ is an equilibrium. To see this, first note that
xrp(srp; σ¯) = x and rrp(srp; σ¯) = r. By the construction of σ¯,
Ui(x,¬R,µ; σ¯) = ui(x) + δ
∑
µ′∈N
pi(µ′|µ)Ui(xrp(x,¬R,µ′; σ¯),
rrp(x,¬R,µ′; σ¯), µ′; σ¯)
= Ui(x,R, µ;σ),
for all actors i and all policies x because all policy outcomes in every
future state remain unchanged and the current rule does not affect future
payoffs. Now suppose the median has a profitable deviation by choosing
x¯ over x. Then the median must prefer the status quo x¯ to x, formally
Uµ(x¯,¬R,µ; σ¯) > Uµ(x,¬R,µ; σ¯). However, if this were the case, the
above string of equalities imply that Uµ(x¯, R, µ;σ) > Uµ(x,R, µ;σ),
which means that the median has a profitable deviation under the
original equilibrium, a contradiction.
Now suppose leader i ∈ {1, 4} has a profitable deviation in the policy
stage. That is
x /∈ arg max
z∈R
Uppi (z, (x¯,¬R,µ); σ¯)).
Consider some xp ∈ R such that Uppi (xp, (x¯,¬R,µ);σ) > Uppi (x, (x¯,¬R,
µ);σ). Let x′ denote the policy outcome associated with proposal xp
given σ¯. Then
Uppi (x
p, (x¯,¬R,µ); σ¯) > Uppi (x, (x¯,¬R,µ); σ¯)
=⇒ Ui(x′,¬R,µ; σ¯) > Ui(x,¬R,µ; σ¯)
=⇒ Ui(x′,¬R,µ;σ) > Ui(x,¬R,µ;σ)
=⇒ Ui(x′,¬R,µ;σ) > Ui(x, r, µ;σ)
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=⇒ U rpi (¬R, srp;σ) > U rpi (R, srp;σ)
=⇒ U rpi (¬R, srp;σ) > U rpi (σrp(srp), srp;σ)
The first implication follows by the definition of x′ and σ¯. The sec-
ond implication follows from the string of equalities in the preced-
ing paragraph. The third implication follows because rules are not
persistent and do not affect future policy outcomes or current pay-
offs, so Ui(x,¬R,µ;σ) = Ui(x,R, µ;σ). The fourth and final impli-
cation follows from the optimality of i’s play at all decision nodes
and the definition of σ. Specifically, because σ is an equilibrium,
U rpi (¬R, srp;σ) ≥ Ui(x′,¬R,µ;σ). However, the last inequality con-
tradicts the assumption that σ is an equilibrium.
A similar argument rules out deviations in the procedural stage. For
one to exist, with the right, there must exist a proposal xp such that
Uppi (x
p, (x¯, R, µ); σ¯) > Uppi (x, (x¯,¬R,µ); σ¯), which would imply that xp
produces policy x′ were Ui(x′, R, µ;σ) > Ui(x,¬R,µ;σ). But the rules
are not persistent and do not directly affect utility outcomes. Therefore,
Ui(x
′,¬R,µ;σ) > Ui(x,¬R,µ;σ). By the argument above, this leads to
a contradiction.
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